Transaction Search Form: please type in any of the fields below.
Date: April 29, 2024 Mon
Time: 9:42 pm
Time: 9:42 pm
Results for boko haram
21 results foundAuthor: Olojo, Akinola Title: Nigeria's Troubled North: Interrogating the Drivers of Public Support for Boko Haram Summary: Over the past decade, the northern region of Nigeria has experienced a surge in terrorist violence instigated by the sectarian group known as Boko Haram. Several analysts have advanced the view that poverty, longstanding economic disparities within Nigeria, and structural violence, are key factors underlying the crisis. However, the complex nature of the situation in Nigeria has at the same time caused some observers to characterise Boko Haram's aggression as violent extremism beyond a domestic agenda. The group's use of suicide attacks particularly presents a dreadful trait typical of international terrorist violence; a style of brutality hitherto alien to the Nigerian state. Nevertheless, Boko Haram has been able to draw upon a considerable base of local sympathy and support largely from the ranks of uneducated, unemployed and impoverished youths in northern Nigeria. In addition, the group's ability to manoeuvre and stage-manage the force of religion in achieving its objectives appears to be dangerously reinforced by the influence of political interests and elites. These multi-dimensional challenges continue to confound the Nigerian government, leaving it struggling to clearly define the problem and to devise a comprehensive strategy to prevent and counter it. This paper argues that the effective formulation and implementation of such a strategy requires an incisive understanding of the political, socio-economic and religious/ideological drivers of public support for Boko Haram. Enhanced knowledge of the recruitment dynamics that feed and sustain the group could particularly inform a more proactive counter-terrorism framework for the Nigerian state. This paper therefore presents the case for a thorough examination of the factors that have inspired public support for Boko Haram and the trajectory of the group's mobilisation of various forms of support in northern Nigeria. This study draws upon a considerable number of open sources and it acknowledges the general difficulty which research in the field of (counter-)terrorism encounters while trying to gather primary source data. In the case of Nigeria, this challenge is more apparent due to the manifold (and on-going) security risks involved in acquiring such data in the north-eastern zones of conflict. Nevertheless, the author of this paper has attempted to complement secondary sources with a modest blend of data obtained through interviews and research reports. Two central questions at the core of this study include: To what extent do socio-economic issues such as poverty and underdevelopment among youths, the role of religion, and political interests explain the motivations for public support for Boko Haram? Second, how can the existing leadership in Nigeria address the escalating crisis; and what role can institutional leadership at the local, national and regional levels play in addressing the problem? One of the theoretical considerations in this paper relates to the structural violence paradigm. Its suggestion of how economic deprivation, class discrimination and societal injustice prevent citizens from reaching their full potential helps to place in context the influence which socio-economic drivers exert on public support for Boko Haram. The awareness that a lack of economic, social and/or political development feeds into the structural factors conducive to terrorism is not new; it already played a prominent role in the first ever resolution adopted by the United Nations (UN) General Assembly (GA) on counter-terrorism in 1972 (GA Resolution 3034). In fact, the logic of the structural violence paradigm, as advocated by its chief proponent Johan Galtung, underscores how socio-cultural systems, political structures and state institutions act as indirect instigators of violence. Individual and group grievances, such as poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, discrimination, and economic marginalisation, can be used as mobilising instruments by sinister groups to find support and recruits for terrorist violence. The relevance of this can also be understood in terms of societal challenges that are increasingly being conceptualised within the framework of human security. As already noted, these issues collectively inform one of the central questions of this study primarily because of its causal link with the crisis context of northern Nigeria. While this is the case, the structural violence approach may very well lose some of its potency when evaluated based on the accounts of other country/conflict settings. Even in the Nigerian situation, and as this paper will further highlight, while structural violence helps to explain the motivations for public support for Boko Haram, it nonetheless remains inadequate as a single factor instigating the crisis. Indeed, not every Boko Haram member that has engaged in violence is socio-economically deprived. At the same time, not every socio-economically deprived individual will be motivated to lend support to acts of terror perpetrated by the group. Therefore, this study acknowledges that there will always be nuances reflected in varying contexts both within and outside the Nigerian case study. After briefly tracing the course of Boko Haram's emergence as a group, this paper will shed light on the bearing which political and elite interests may have exerted on public support for Boko Haram. Subsequently, the socio-economic context of the crisis will be examined with a view to determining the degree to which it incites public support for Boko Haram. Beyond these issues are other intervening variables that are frequently at play within the Nigerian state. The fifth section will focus on the most important among these, probing the catalytic role of religion and how this has been exploited by the group in generating mass appeal in the north. The sixth part will explore the often assumed external dimension of Boko Haram's activities within the context of weapons, terrorist funding and foreign fighters. The concluding sections will underscore what is instructive about the lessons emerging from the undercurrents of public support for the group, while also reflecting on implications for the development of more robust and concerted counter-terrorism policies. Details: The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2013. 20 p. Source: Internet Resource: ICCT Research Paper: Accessed July 14, 2014 at: http://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-Olojo-Nigerias-Troubled-North-October-2013.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Nigeria URL: http://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-Olojo-Nigerias-Troubled-North-October-2013.pdf Shelf Number: 132671 Keywords: Boko HaramCounter-TerrorismExtremist GroupsRadical GroupsSocioeconomic Conditions TerrorismTerrorist Recruitment |
Author: Human Rights Watch Title: "Those Terrible Weeks in their Camp". Boko Haram Violence against Women and Girls in Northeast Nigeria Summary: In April 2014, the Islamist group Boko Haram abducted 276 female students from a secondary school in Chibok, Borno State, in Nigeria's northeast. The group has abducted more than 500 women and girls from Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa States since 2009. Based field research in northeast Nigeria and Abuja, the capital city, including interviews with women and girls who escaped abduction or were freed from captivity, social workers, journalists, religious leaders, civil society workers, state and federal government officials, and witnesses of abductions, "Those Terrible Weeks in their Camp" documents how Boko Haram targets women and girls. The report highlights the harrowing experiences of some of the abducted women and girls, many of whom have endured physical and psychological abuse, forced conversions, coerced marriages, forced labor, sexual violence and rape. To ensure accountability, the report calls on Nigerian authorities to investigate and prosecute, based on international fair trial standards, those who committed serious crimes in violation of international law, including Boko Haram, members of the security forces and pro-government vigilante groups. In addition, the government should provide adequate measures to protect schools and the right to education, and ensure access to medical and mental health services to victims of abduction and other violence. The government should also ensure that hospitals and clinics treating civilian victims of Boko Haram atrocities are equipped with medical supplies to treat survivors of sexual and gender-based violence. Details: New York: HRW, 2014. 69p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 30, 2014 at: http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/nigeria1014web.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Nigeria URL: http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/nigeria1014web.pdf Shelf Number: 133881 Keywords: AbductionBoko HaramGender-Based ViolenceKidnappingRapeSexual ViolenceViolence Against GirlsViolence Against Women (Nigeria) |
Author: Pantucci, Raffaello Title: From Boko Haram to Ansaru: The Evolution of Nigerian Jihad Summary: Its orchestration of several major incidents - including the kidnapping of nearly 300 girls from their school in Chibok in Borno State - has sparked national, regional and international responses. The character of these counter-operations, however, has relied overwhelmingly on a military approach unable to defeat a resilient Boko Haram. Nigeria's forceful approach reflects rash decision-making founded neither on a considered strategy nor a thorough understanding of the target group. Drawing on the wide-ranging body of existing literature, this report examines the evolution of Boko Haram from its inception to its modern iteration, deconstructing its supposed cohesive ideology and chain of command. Rather than a single unit, Boko Haram is best considered as falling along a spectrum, with an ideology as fluid and flexible as its relationships with similar jihadist groups, including Ansaru - a breakaway faction with perhaps a close relationship to the core. The report examines how the ideological narratives championed by the key leaders of Boko Haram have shaped the group's present-day structure and tactics and a military approach alone is insufficient to defeat the group. With a newly-elected government, Nigeria has the opportunity to address the Boko Haram threat effectively, but true success will rely on a solid understanding and appreciation of this elusive and resilient opponent. Details: London: Royal United Services Institute, 2015. 46p. Source: Internet Resource: Occasional Paper: Accessed August 8, 2015 at: https://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/201504_OP_From_Boko_Haram_to_Ansaru_web.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Nigeria URL: Shelf Number: 136368 Keywords: Boko HaramExtremist GroupsRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorismViolent Exxtremism |
Author: International Crisis Group Title: Curbing Violence in Nigeria (III): Revisiting the Niger Delta Summary: Violence in the Niger Delta may soon increase unless the Nigerian government acts quickly and decisively to address long-simmering grievances. With the costly Presidential Amnesty Program for ex-insurgents due to end in a few months, there are increasingly bitter complaints in the region that chronic poverty and catastrophic oil pollution, which fuelled the earlier rebellion, remain largely unaddressed. Since Goodluck Jonathan, the first president from the Delta, lost re-election in March, some activists have resumed agitation for greater resource control and self-determination, and a number of ex-militant leaders are threatening to resume fighting ("return to the creeks"). While the Boko Haram insurgency in the North East is the paramount security challenge, President Muhammadu Buhari rightly identifies the Delta as a priority. He needs to act firmly but carefully to wind down the amnesty program gradually, revamp development and environmental programs, facilitate passage of the long-stalled Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) and improve security and rule of law across the region. The Technical Committee on the Niger Delta, a special body mandated in 2008 to advance solutions to the region's multiple problems, proposed the amnesty program, whose implementation since 2009, coupled with concessions to former militant leaders, brought a semblance of peace and enabled oil production to regain pre-insurgency levels. However, the government has largely failed to carry out other recommendations that addressed the insurgency's root causes, including inadequate infrastructure, environmental pollution, local demands for a bigger share of oil revenues, widespread poverty and youth unemployment. Two agencies established to drive development, the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) and the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs (MNDA), have floundered. Two others mandated to restore the oil-polluted environment (particularly in Ogoni Land) and curb or manage hundreds of oil spills yearly, the Hydrocarbon Pollution Restoration Project (HYPREP) and the National Oil Spills Detection and Response Agency (NOSDRA), have been largely ineffective. The PIB, intended to improve oil and gas industry governance and possibly also create special funds for communities in petroleum-producing areas, has been stuck in the National Assembly (federal parliament) since 2009. In sum, seven years after the technical committee's report, the conditions that sparked the insurgency could easily trigger a new phase of violent conflict. The outcome of the presidential election has also heightened tensions. While most people in the region acknowledge that Jonathan lost, some former militant leaders and groups accept Buhari only conditionally. For instance, the Niger Delta People's Salvation Front (NDPSF), the civil successor to the militant Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force (NDPVF), claims Jonathan's ouster was the product of a conspiracy by northerners and the Yoruba from the South West against the Delta peoples and the South East. Apparently influenced by that view, some groups are resuming old demands, hardly heard during the Jonathan presidency, for regional autonomy or "self-determination". Local tensions generated by the polls also pose risks, particularly in Rivers state, where Governor Nyesom Wike (of ex-President Jonathan's People's Democratic Party, PDP) and ex-Governor Rotimi Amaechi (of President Buhari's All Progressives Congress, APC) are bitter foes. With many guns in unauthorised hands, politically motivated assassinations and kidnappings for ransom, already common, could increase. Policy and institutional changes are necessary but, if not prepared and implemented inclusively and transparently, could themselves trigger conflict. Buhari has declared that the amnesty program, which costs over $500 million per year, is due to end in December. He has terminated petroleum pipeline protection contracts that Jonathan awarded to companies owned by ex-militant leaders and the Yoruba ethnic militia, O'odua People's Congress (OPC), and may streamline the Delta's inefficient development-intervention agencies. He may also withdraw the PIB from parliament for revision. Some of this is desirable, even inevitable, but a number of former militant leaders and other entrenched interests threaten resistance and a possible return to violence. A perception that the government's actions are reversing the Delta's gains could aggravate local grievances and precipitate armed violence. At its peak in 2009, the insurgency in the Niger Delta was claiming an estimated 1,000 lives a year, had cut Nigeria's oil output by over 50 per cent and was costing the government close to four billion naira (nearly $19 million) per day in counter-insurgency operations. A resurgence of violence and increased oil-related crime in the Delta could seriously undermine national security and economic stability, which is already weighed down by the Boko Haram insurgency and dwindling oil revenues. Details: Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2015. 38p. Source: Internet Resource: Africa Report No. 231: Accessed September 30, 2015 at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/west-africa/nigeria/231-curbing-violence-in-nigeria-iii-re-visiting-the-niger-delta.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Nigeria URL: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/west-africa/nigeria/231-curbing-violence-in-nigeria-iii-re-visiting-the-niger-delta.pdf Shelf Number: 136897 Keywords: Boko HaramHuman Rights Oil IndustryPolitical Corruption PollutioniViolence Violent Crimes |
Author: Cold-Ravnkilde, Signe Title: Boko Haram: From local grievances to violent insurgency Summary: It is estimated that Boko Haram has killed more than twenty thousand people since 2009, making it the world's deadliest terror organisation that threatens to destabilise not only Nigeria, but the entire region of the Sahel. Since the inauguration of a regional multi-national joint task force heavily supported by western international security actors, attacks in the affected neighbouring countries has increased remarkably. This suggests that more international and regional military responses might in fact fuel more attacks by Boko Haram. Rather than rephrasing decontextualised discourses of trans-Saharan terrorism, this new DIIS report by Signe Cold-Ravnkilde and Sine Plambech suggests that international support to the fight against Boko Haram should be based on a careful understanding of the complex local and regional dynamics of conflict. The report provides an overview of the situation and the historic development as well as suggesting a number of policy recommendations. -There is a dire need to ensure that the current military operations do not repeat the mistakes of the Nigerian security forces in 2013: human rights violation and economic sanctions that may transform a jihadist uprising into a people's revolt. - Gender norms and how men and women are affected by and take part in the insurgency both as combatants and protesters against Boko Haram should be taking into account in policy makers' response to the insurgency. -Insecurity in Nigeria and the affected neighbouring countries requires a comprehensive approach including socio-economic perspectives on contending local incitements to engage in illicit economic and terrorist activities. Details: Copenhagen: DIIS - Danish Institute for International Studies, 2015. 39p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 25, 2016 at: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/DIIS_Report_21_Boko_Haram_WEB.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Nigeria URL: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/DIIS_Report_21_Boko_Haram_WEB.pdf Shelf Number: 137976 Keywords: Boko HaramExtremist GroupsViolence Against Women, GirlsViolent Crime |
Author: International Alert Title: 'Bad Blood': Perceptions of children born of conflict-related sexual violence and women and girls associated with Boko Haram in northeast Nigeria Summary: This research found that girls and women kidnapped by Nigeria's insurgent group, Jama'at Ahl as-Sunnah lid-da'wa wal-Jihad (JAS), commonly known as Boko Haram, face mistrust and persecution upon their return to society. International Alert and UNICEF carried out the research in Borno in northeast Nigeria to understand the impact of communities' and authorities' perceptions of these women, girls and their children on safety, rehabilitation and reintegration opportunities. The report provides policy and programming recommendations to ensure that reintegration and relocation plans are conflict sensitive and support child protection and peace-building outcomes. Details: London: International Alert; Abuja, Nigeria, UNICEF Nigeria, 2016. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 29, 2016 at: http://www.international-alert.org/sites/default/files/Nigeria_BadBlood_EN_2016.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Nigeria URL: Shelf Number: 137996 Keywords: Boko HaramConflict-Related Sexual ViolenceRapeSexual ViolenceViolence Against Women, Girls |
Author: Mercy Corps Title: "Motivations and Empty Promises": Voices of Former Boko Haram Combatants and Nigerian Youth Summary: Boko Haram, one of the world's deadliest armed groups, is waging an insurgency in the name of creating an Islamic caliphate. This violent conflict in Nigeria's Northeast has killed nearly 17,000 people since 2009, displaced nearly 2.2 million people, devastated thousands of communities, and slowed the economy. New Mercy Corps research investigates key motives for youth to join Boko Haram, so that government actors, donors and civil society can design responsive programming to reduce youth participation in the violence. Through this research, Mercy Corps spoke directly to the youth involved to learn why youth join or were vulnerable to forced recruitment into Boko Haram. We spoke with 47 former members of Boko Haram in Nigeria's Borno, Yobe, and Gombe states, in addition to dozens of youth who did not join, family and friends of members, and community leaders. We found that in the midst of challenges, the local strategies to prevent violence and support youth exercised by so many communities can form a strong foundation for the future of youth and stability in Northeast Nigeria. Key Findings There is no demographic profile of a Boko Haram member. Members we spoke to came from diverse backgrounds. Some had jobs, and others did not. Some had attended secular school, others Islamic school, and others had dropped out. Influence from social and business peers is a key factor in recruitment. Almost all former members cited a friend, family member, or business colleague as a factor in their joining Boko Haram. Youth see in Boko Haram an opportunity to get ahead through business support. Many youth described either accepting loans prior to joining or joining with the hope of receiving loans or capital for their mostly small, informal businesses; loans fueled their economic ambitions in an atmosphere of high inequality. Broad frustrations with government created initial community acceptance of Boko Haram. Boko Haram took advantage of deep grievances around government inadequacies and security abuses to gain a foothold in communities. About half of former members said their communities at some time generally supported the group, hoping it would bring a change in government. Local counter-narratives on the hypocrisy of Boko Haram are working. Youth who resisted joining shared a narrative of Boko Haram as a corrupt, greedy organization focused on enriching its leaders. These messages are being crafted by local religious and traditional leaders. Key Recommendations Build trust in government by addressing the needs of conflict-affected youth and communities. Prepare for comprehensive reintegration of former members. Amplify local counter-narratives that already work to prevent recruitment into Boko Haram. Develop opportunities for youth and government officials to improve communities together. Facilitate connections to role models and support family dialogue on violent extremism. Help youth achieve their ambitions, starting with increasing their access to financial and business services. Details: Portland, OR: Mercy Corps, 2016. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 2, 2016 at: https://d2zyf8ayvg1369.cloudfront.net/sites/default/files/Motivations%20and%20Empty%20Promises_Mercy%20Corps_Full%20Report_0.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Nigeria URL: https://d2zyf8ayvg1369.cloudfront.net/sites/default/files/Motivations%20and%20Empty%20Promises_Mercy%20Corps_Full%20Report_0.pdf Shelf Number: 139949 Keywords: Boko HaramExtremist GroupsExtremistsRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorists |
Author: Ogbozor, Ernest Title: Resilience to Violent Extremism: The Rural Livelihood Coping Strategies in the Lake Chad Basin Summary: This paper is an analysis of the effects of violent extremism and the rural livelihoods strategies for coping with threats from Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin. Since 2009, the Lake Chad Basin has witnessed increasing insurgency activities from the Boko Haram militants, leading to the destruction of lives, livelihoods, and displacements. However, studies have shown that while violent conflict has destructive impacts on lives and livelihoods--more people survive than perish. People threatened by violence from the extremist group cannot afford to wait for help; they adopt strategies to survive and protect their livelihoods. This study explores these mechanisms through review and analysis of the literature and current research in the Lake Chad Basin. The paper argues, the violence from Boko Haram has both direct and indirect effects on households whose primary sources of livelihoods are dependent on the resources from the basin. In response, the affected households adopt both positive and adverse strategies to mitigate immediate and longterm threats from the militant groups. The study contributes to a more nuanced understanding of rural resilience to violent extremism in the Lake Chad Basin Details: Brighton, UK: Households in Conflict Network, Institute of Development Studies, 2016. 21p. Source: Internet Resource: HiCN Working paper 237: Accessed December 8, 2016 at: http://www.hicn.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/HiCN-WP-237.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Africa URL: http://www.hicn.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/HiCN-WP-237.pdf Shelf Number: 140359 Keywords: Boko Haram Extremist Groups Violent Extremism |
Author: Assanvo, William Title: Assessing the Multinational Joint Task Force against Boko Haram Summary: The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), established by the Lake Chad Basin countries to combat Boko Haram, still struggles to demonstrate its effectiveness. Observers also continue to question to what extent it is operational. Yet despite the numerous political, logistical, technical and financial challenges it has been facing, the MNJTF is gradually gaining ground. Details: Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2016. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: Issue 10: Accessed February 17, 2017 at: https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/war19.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Africa URL: https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/war19.pdf Shelf Number: 146970 Keywords: Boko HaramCounter-TerrorismRadical GroupsTerrorismViolent Extremists |
Author: Botha, Anneli Title: Understanding Nigerian citizens' perspectives on Boko Haram Summary: This monograph presents the findings of a study aimed at understanding Boko Haram from the perspective of ordinary Nigerian citizens. Using field and desktop research, the study analyses a cross section of perspectives on the political context of Boko Haram and the dynamics surrounding the group's existence. The study identifies complex factors, including financial incentives, that motivate individuals to join the group, and underscores the need for multifaceted and multi-layered responses. Details: Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2017. 112p. Source: Internet Resource: ISS Monograph Number 196: Accessed March 2, 2017 at: https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/monograph196.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Nigeria URL: https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/monograph196.pdf Shelf Number: 141292 Keywords: Boko HaramCitizen AttitudesExtremist GroupsRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorismTerrorist RecruitmentTerrorists |
Author: Ewi, Martin Title: Money Talks: A key reason youths join Boko Haram Summary: This policy brief is an overview of key findings from a study aimed at understanding violent extremism in northern Nigeria, and identifying factors that are key in Boko Haram recruitment and membership. This analysis contributes to knowledge about the political and socio-economic preferences of the individuals involved in the group. This policy brief highlights one of the major findings of the study, namely the perception that financial incentives, not religion, are a key motivator for individuals who join Boko Haram. Recommendations The following recommendations could assist the Nigerian government in combating Boko Haram: 1 Promoting a common Nigerian identity that transcends ethnic, religious and geographic lines by reviewing school curricula and programmes to mainstream national identity. 2 Declare, but don't negotiate the terms of amnesty with Boko Haram: government should declare a blanket amnesty for low- and mid-level Boko Haram militants who may wish to give up arms. 3 Establishing a criminal tribunal to investigate and prosecute Boko Haram militants and others who bear the greatest responsibility for the group’s atrocities. 4 Preventing and combating sources of radicalisation by working with local communities and religious leaders to identify strategies for dissuading vulnerable individuals from turning to violent extremism Details: Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2017. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: Police Brief 98: Accessed march 2, 2017 at: https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/policybrief98.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Nigeria URL: https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/policybrief98.pdf Shelf Number: 141293 Keywords: Boko HaramExtremismExtremist GroupsRadical GroupsRadicalizationSocioeconomic Conditions and CrimeTerrorist RecruitmentViolent Extremism |
Author: Salifu, Uyo Title: Boko Haram and violent extremism: Perspectives from peacebuilders Summary: The atrocities unleashed by Boko Haram since 2009 have affected millions of people in Nigeria and the region as a whole. This policy brief presents the results of a field-based study on peacebuilders' perspectives of the drivers of violent extremism; and the underlying socio-economic and political factors that influence individuals to join Boko Haram. The study reveals that peacebuilders consider religious dynamics as the most influential factor in individuals' decision to join the terrorist group. As such, the study reveals that peacebuilders' views regarding the drivers of violent extremism are often markedly different to those expressed by former Boko Haram members themselves. Details: Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2017. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Brief 97: Accessed March 3, 2017 at: https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/policybrief97.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Nigeria URL: https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/policybrief97.pdf Shelf Number: 141318 Keywords: Boko HaramExtremist GroupsPeacebuildersRadical GroupsViolent Extremism |
Author: International Crisis Group Title: Nigeria: Women and the Boko Haram Insurgency Summary: Boko Haram's rise and insurgency have dramatically changed the lives of thousands of women and girls, often casting them voluntarily or by force into new roles outside the domestic sphere. Some joined to escape their social conditions; others were abducted and enslaved. Seven years of war have caused gender-specific suffering. While men have disproportionally been killed, women are an overwhelming majority among the estimated 1.8 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the North East. As former wives, slaves or fighters, many bear the stigma of association with the insurgents and are barred from reintroduction into their communities, in part because the lines between militant, sympathiser and forced accomplice are blurred. Although Boko Haram faces strong pushback, it remains capable of launching attacks and conducting multiple suicide bombings. Understanding how women experience the conflict, not only as victims but also as actors, needs to directly inform policies and programs to tackle the roots of the insurgency and strategies for curbing it, as well as facilitate women’s contribution to lasting peace. Since its emergence in 2002, Boko Haram has paid particular attention to women in rhetoric and actions, partly because of the intense debate surrounding their role in society in the North East. Among other revivalist Islamic movements, the sect called for tighter restrictions on them in some areas of life but also promoted their access to Islamic education and offered financial empowerment. With patriarchy, poverty, corruption, early marriage and illiteracy long thwarting their life chances, some women saw an opportunity in Boko Haram to advance their freedoms or reduce their hardship. Many valued the religious and moral anchoring. Thereafter, Boko Haram began to abduct women and girls for both political and pragmatic ends, including to protest the arrest of female members and relatives of some leaders. The seizure of more than 200 schoolgirls near Chibok in 2014 was a much publicised spike in a wider trend. The group took Christian and later Muslim females to hurt communities that opposed it, as a politically symbolic imposition of its will and as assets. By awarding “wives” to fighters, it attracted male recruits and incentivised combatants. Because women were not considered a threat, female followers and forced conscripts could initially circulate in government-controlled areas more easily, as spies, messengers, recruiters and smugglers. For the same reason, from mid-2014, Boko Haram turned to female suicide bombers. Increasingly pressed for manpower, it also trained women to fight. As vigilante militia members, including with the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF), hundreds of women help security forces, particularly to frisk females at checkpoints, gather information and identify suspects, and also sometimes to fight Boko Haram. Others work in non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and women’s associations or care privately for war victims. In some cases, the war has opened opportunities for women’s activism, illustrated by the establishment of several new women-led NGOs in Maiduguri and the Nigerian involvement in the Bring Back Our Girls international campaign. Boko Haram attacks, the military’s persecution of suspects and its strategy of emptying contested areas have forced over a million women and girls to flee homes. Some suspected supporters are in detention. Hundreds of thousands of females are in government camps where food is scarce and healthcare dismal; in unofficial camps, the situation can be even worse. Separated from husbands and sons conscripted or killed by Boko Haram or arrested by security forces, many women are now fully responsible for their families’ protection and economic wellbeing. Harsh treatment of IDPs in camps and detention centres could undermine military gains. If corruption in aid delivery and abuses persist, communities may harbour grievances that could lead them to reject state authority. Meanwhile, the stigma carried by women and girls known or suspected to have been Boko Haram members risks leaving them and their children isolated and alienated, generating new frustration and resistance of the kind that gave rise to Boko Haram. How gender dynamics play a part in fuelling the Boko Haram insurgency should be a clear warning that women’s integration into decision-making processes at all levels is critical to a durable peace. Countering the sect and rebuilding a peaceful society in the North East requires the government and its international partners to tackle gender discrimination, better protect women and girls affected by the violence and support women's economic and social reintegration, as well as enhance their role in building sustainable peace. In the short term, reunification of families should be a priority. In the longer term, improvements and gender balance in accessing education, in both state schools and upgraded Quranic schools, is vital. Details: Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2016. 34p. Source: Internet Resource: Africa Report No. 242: Accessed march 8, 2017 at: https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/242-nigeria-women-and-the-boko-haram%20Insurgency.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Nigeria URL: https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/242-nigeria-women-and-the-boko-haram%20Insurgency.pdf Shelf Number: 141379 Keywords: Boko HaramFemale TerroristsJihadistsRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorismViolence Against Women, Girls |
Author: International Crisis Group Title: Watchmen of Lake Chad: Vigilante Groups Fighting Boko Haram Summary: Vigilante groups in Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger and Chad play a major role in the fight against Boko Haram, but their presence raises concerns. They make military operations less blunt and more effective and have reconnected these states somewhat with many of their local communities, but they have also committed abuses and become involved in the war economy. In Nigeria in particular, vigilantism did much to turn an anti-state insurgency into a bloodier civil war, pitting Boko Haram against communities and leading to drastic increases in violence. As the conflict continues to evolve, so will vigilantes. They are enmeshed with high politics, especially in Nigeria, and in local intercommunal relations, business operations and chiefdoms. Their belief that they should be rewarded will need to be addressed, and it is also important for the Lake Chad basin states to address the common gap in community policing, particularly in rural areas. To ensure vigilantes are not a future source of insecurity, these states will each need to devise their own mix of slowly disbanding and formalising and regulating them. Vigilantism, the recourse to non-state actors to enforce law and order (of a sort), has a history in the Lake Chad region. Colonial powers there relied, to a substantial degree, on local traditional chiefs and their retinues. The multi-faceted crisis in governance and decline in services among the Lake Chad states since the 1980s gave rise to new vigilante groups. The law and order challenges vigilantes tried to address were a factor in the formation and growth of Boko Haram, itself an attempt to provide regulation and guidance. The vigilante fight against Boko Haram started in 2013, in Maiduguri, the Borno state capital and the insurgency's epicentre, under the twin pressure of mounting jihadist violence and security force retaliation. The Joint Task Force (JTF), led by the Nigerian army, quickly realised the vigilantes’ potential as a source of local knowledge, intelligence and manpower and set out to help organise it, with the assistance of local and traditional authorities. Operating under the unofficial but revealing name of Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF), vigilantes were essential in flushing Boko Haram out of the city, then began replicating throughout the state. The official use of vigilantes to fight the movement spread further in Nigeria, then to Cameroon in 2014 and Chad in 2015, where the groups are known as comités de vigilance. Niger has been more cautious, partly because of past struggles with armed groups and because it has not needed them as much. Vigilantes have played many roles, from mostly discrete surveillance networks in Niger to military combat auxiliaries or semi-autonomous fighting forces in Nigeria. For the region’s overstretched and under pressure militaries, they have somewhat filled the security gap and provided local knowledge. They have made the military response more targeted and more efficient, but their mobilisation also provoked retribution by Boko Haram against their communities and contributed to the massive levels of civilian casualties in 2014 and 2015. Paradoxically, this, too, has favoured regional governments’ strategy of pushing civilians away from the jihadists. As the insurgency splinters and falls back on more discrete guerrilla operations and terror attacks, however, the time has come to measure the risks posed by such a massive mobilisation of vigilantes (they claim to be about 26,000 in Borno state alone). Their compensation demands will have to be addressed, especially if authorities consider offering deals to Boko Haram militants to lay down their weapons. In the longer term, vigilantes may become political foot soldiers, turn to organised crime or feed communal violence. Vigilantism can be a powerful counter-insurgency tool, but there is a compelling need to confront the immediate concerns it raises, notably in terms of impunity, and to begin planning for its long-term post-conflict transformation. Details: Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2017. 37p. Source: Internet Resource: Africa Report No. 244: Accessed March 8, 2017 at: https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/244-watchmen-of-lake-chad-vigilante-groups-fighting-boko-haram.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Chad URL: https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/244-watchmen-of-lake-chad-vigilante-groups-fighting-boko-haram.pdf Shelf Number: 141380 Keywords: Boko HaramJihadistsTerrorismVigilantesVigilantism |
Author: Aduku, Emmanuel Baba Title: A Study of Violence-Related Deaths in Karasuwa, Machina, Nguru, And Yusufari Local Governement Areas of Yobe State Summary: Invisible violence exists in some rural areas in northern Nigeria. 'Invisible' here entails lack of available documented instances of fatal violence in such areas. Against this backdrop, the lack of data has prompted this study to unearth, document, and evaluate any occurrences of lethal violence in Karasuwa, Machina, Nguru, and Yusufari local government areas (LGAs) of Yobe State from 2006 to 2014. The specific objectives are to: Assess invisible violence in Karasuwa, Machina, Nguru, and Yusufari LGAs in Yobe State Identify the causes of lethal violence Document the series of fatal incidents through terrorism, ethno-religious conflicts, land disputes, and political clashes. The field research gathered evidence of the drivers of violence through desktop research and review of secondary materials such as media reports, Internet sources, databases, policy reports, and academic literature, combined with the administration of questionnaires and the conduct of unstructured interviews. According to the findings, the lack of data on fatal incidents in Karasuwa, Machina, Nguru, and Yusufari LGAs is not due to the lack of violence but to a host of issues such as the lack of infrastructure for the media. The study also discovered that, since 2012, the Boko Haram insurgency has become a significant cause of violent death. The majority of respondents (71%) saw their neighbourhoods as violent, and more than 96% were aware of the occurrence of fatal incidents in their communities in the previous 10 years. Details: Ibadan, Nigeria: FRA Institute of African Studies , University of Ibadan 2015. 30p. Source: Internet Resource: IFRA-Nigeria working papers series, no 55: Accessed April 11, 2017 at: http://www.ifra-nigeria.org/publications/e-papers/invisible-violence-project/88-aduku-emmanuel-baba-2015-a-study-of-violence-related-deaths-in-karasuwa-machina-nguru-and-yusufari-local-governement-areas-of-yobe-state Year: 2015 Country: Nigeria URL: http://www.ifra-nigeria.org/publications/e-papers/invisible-violence-project/88-aduku-emmanuel-baba-2015-a-study-of-violence-related-deaths-in-karasuwa-machina-nguru-and-yusufari-local-governement-areas-of-yobe-state Shelf Number: 144791 Keywords: Boko HaramHomicides Lethal Violence Murders Violence Violent Crime |
Author: Munir, A. Title: A Study of Violence-Related Deaths in Gudu, Gwadabawa and Illela Local Government Areas of Sokoto State, and Sakaba Local Government Area of Kebbi State (2006-2014) Summary: This paper highlights the outcome of a study on fatal incidents in four local government areas (LGAs) of northwestern Nigeria: Gwadabawa, Gudu, and Ilella LGAs in Sokoto State, and Sakaba LGA in Kebbi State. Data obtained from 1,083 questionnaires (out of 1,200) reveals that, since 2006, the year 2011 had the highest number of fatalities. Between 2006 and 2014, Gudu LGA recorded the highest number of fatalities and violent incidents, while Sakaba LGA had the lowest. For the period under review, the most frequent cause of fatal incidents was cattle grazing, followed by political clashes. Religion, which is often perceived as a major factor of conflict, contributed quite insignificantly to the overall level of violence in the four LGAs, with a few incidents involving the Yan Shi'a, the Tijaniyya Sufi brotherhood, and the Yan Izala movement. Finally, the study demonstrates that, just as in the urban centres of Sokoto and Kebbi, there are many fatal incidents in rural areas- yet these are unreported. Some explanations for this omission are discussed in relation to poor road infrastructure. Details: Ibadan, Nigeria: FRA Institute of African Studies , University of Ibadan, 2015. 45p. Source: Internet Resource: IFRA-Nigeria working papers series, no 47; Accessed April 11, 2017 at: http://www.ifra-nigeria.org/publications/e-papers/invisible-violence-project/85-munir-arshad-olojo-akinola-2015-a-study-of-violence-related-deaths-in-gudu-gwadabawa-and-illela-local-government-areas-of-sokoto-state-and-sakaba-local-government-area-of-kebbi-state-2006-2014 Year: 2015 Country: Nigeria URL: http://www.ifra-nigeria.org/publications/e-papers/invisible-violence-project/85-munir-arshad-olojo-akinola-2015-a-study-of-violence-related-deaths-in-gudu-gwadabawa-and-illela-local-government-areas-of-sokoto-state-and-sakaba Shelf Number: 144793 Keywords: Boko HaramRural AreasViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Warner, Jason Title: Exploding Stereotypes: The Unexpected Operational Characteristics of Boko Haram's Suicide Bombers Summary: Introduction Since 2009, the Islamist group known as Boko Haram (formally known as Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad, or more recently, the Islamic State's West Africa Province [ISWAP]) has ushered in a wave of violence across the Lake Chad Basin region of West Africa, at the intersection of Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. Among other tactics that it has employed during its reign of terror, the group has been noted for its use of suicide bombers. While the prevalence of suicide bombings has been duly recognized, little remains known about the broader arc of their existence and efficacy: What strategic and operational trends underlie Boko Haram's use of suicide bombers, and how effective have they been at achieving their objectives? Just who are Boko Haram's suicide bombers? Where are they deployed, what do they target, and how do diferent bomber demographics difer in their actions? More broadly, what does Boko Haram's use of suicide bombers reveal about the past, present, and future of the terrorist group? Methodology Drawing on analysis of an original dataset of all Boko Haram suicide bombings from their first deployment in April 2011 to June 2017, this report presents the fullest picture available to date that tracks and analyzes Boko Haram's use of suicide bombers. To do so, we investigate two main phenomena from our dataset: operational trends of bombers (longitudinal trends, lethality, injuries, geography, and targeting trends) and demographic trends of bombers (gender, age, and recruitment). From these trends, we assert that it is possible to categorize Boko Haram's suicide bombing eforts into four distinct historical phases. In light of our understanding of the group's past and present operational and demographic trends, we conclude by suggesting how the group might act in the future and how counter-terrorism efforts might best address its likely incarnations. Overall Findings In the main, we argue that Boko Haram's operational profile is noteworthy in that, despite the attention the group garners for its deployment of suicide bombers, it shows itself to be less effective than otherwise expected in using them. Concurrently, we argue that Boko Haram's demographic profile is unique in that it created novel uses for women and children in its suicide bombing efforts, rendering it distinctive among extant and historical terrorist groups. Our dataset reveals that from April 11, 2011, to June 30, 2017, Boko Haram deployed 434 bombers to 247 diferent targets during 238 suicide-bombing attacks. At least 56% of these bombers were women, and at least 81 bombers were specifically identified as children or teenagers. A more comprehensive overview follows. Details: West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 2017. 53p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 30, 2017 at: https://ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Exploding-Stereotypes-1.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: https://ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Exploding-Stereotypes-1.pdf Shelf Number: 146957 Keywords: Boko HaramIslamic StateSuicide BombersSuicide BombingsTerrorismTerrorists |
Author: Warner, Jason Title: Targeted Terror: The Suicide Bombers of al-Shabaab Summary: Al-Shabaab, an Islamist terrorist group that has been plaguing Somalia since 2006, was named the most deadly terror group in Africa in 2017 by the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED). One tactic that al-Shabaab uses in its reign of terror is suicide bombing. Despite recognition of the seriousness of the threat that al-Shabaab's suicide bombers pose, very little is known about how, when, and why al-Shabaab elects to employ the tactic of suicide bombings. This report answers these questions. By analyzing a unique dataset compiled by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point that tracks all instances of al-Shabaab suicide bombings between the group's first suicide attack on September 18, 2006, to the end of our data collection in October 2017, the authors offer the most comprehensive account to date on the emergence, evolution, and efficacy on al-Shabaab's suicide bombers. They find that al-Shabaab has deployed at least 216 suicide attackers who carried out a total of 155 suicide bombing attacks, killing at least 595 and as many as 2,218 people. Their data indicates that al-Shabaab's suicide attacks are highly targeted, aimed at degrading the Somali state and members of the international community (United Nations, African Union, or African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)) that are combating it. Unlike certain other terrorist groups, al-Shabaab's suicide attacks tend to attempt to avoid targeting non-combatant civilians, and thus do not seem to be undertaken simply to engender shock and awe. Their data also reveals information about just who serves as al-Shabaab's suicide bombers; where they target; al-Shabaab's suicide bombing delivery tendencies; and timing trends along months and days of the week. In conclusion, they offer suggestions about how to combat the group's suicide bombing efforts in the future. Details: West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 2018. 45p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 13, 2018 at: https://ctc.usma.edu/app/uploads/2018/02/Targeted-Terror-2.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Africa URL: https://ctc.usma.edu/app/uploads/2018/02/Targeted-Terror-2.pdf Shelf Number: 149106 Keywords: Boko HaramIslamic StateSuicide BombersSuicide BombingsTerrorismTerrorists |
Author: Zenn, Jacob Title: Boko Haram Beyond the Headlines: Analyses of Africa's Enduring Insurgency Summary: In a conflict that has no easy answers and no solutions in sight, Boko Haram is already and will remain one of Africa's enduring insurgencies. In order to better understand Boko Haram now and in the future, this report, edited by Jacob Zenn, challenges some key misconceptions about the insurgency and provides new analyses and insights based on many exclusive primary source materials and datasets. To provide these unique insights, several authors with on-the-ground experience contribute to six areas that are increasingly important but under-researched about Boko Haram and Islamic State in West Africa: - Ideology (Abdulbasit Kassim) - Gender (Elizabeth Pearson) - Leadership (Atta Barkindo) - Counterinsurgency (Idayat Hassan and Zacharias Pieri) - Regional dynamics (Omar Mahmoud) - Terrorist networks (Jacob Zenn) It is hoped that these analyses of 'Africa's enduring insurgency' will be useful to counterterrorism practitioners, humanitarian organizations, and academia and will assist in understanding and, ultimately, mitigating and resolving the conflict. Details: West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism center at West Point, 2018. 144p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 23, 2018 at: https://ctc.usma.edu/app/uploads/2018/05/Boko-Haram-Beyond-the-Headlines.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Africa URL: https://ctc.usma.edu/app/uploads/2018/05/Boko-Haram-Beyond-the-Headlines.pdf Shelf Number: 150341 Keywords: Boko HaramRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorismTerrorists |
Author: Mahmood, Omar S. Title: Responses to Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Region: Policies, Cooperation and Livelihoods Summary: This report, produced by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), is the second in a two-part study examining current dynamics with regards to violent extremist organisations (VEOs) operating in the Lake Chad region (Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, Niger). The first report examined factionalism within the Boko Haram movement, while the second report profiles current responses and challenges. The Lake Chad region is characterised by a number of factors which make it conducive to the presence of non-state actors. No single factor explains the emergence and rise of Boko Haram in the region, but understanding the overall context is important to understanding the movement itself. Chief among the factors enabling the rise of Boko Haram include a limited state presence and poor governance, underdevelopment and unemployment, environmental pressures enhanced by the receding waters of Lake Chad and desertification, and a deep history of Islamic conservatism. While those factors describe the shared overall context in which Boko Haram has operated and thrived, responses have differed across the region. The development of the Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) has played an instrumental role in terms of coordinating military action, but cooperation has generally been restricted to this sphere, and largely amounts to joint military operations around border locations. Yet, positive signs of increased military cooperation have begun to appear. In addition, Nigerian security forces have undertaken a number of internal offensives, though it is unclear to what degree the security apparatus has considered the split within Boko Haram and adjusted its operating methods accordingly. Rather, it appears that the focus initially centered on Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad (JAS) and its leader Abubakar Shekau, instead of Islamic State West Africa (ISIS-WA), although a more equitable balance in terms of operational targeting has emerged lately. In Cameroon, the country second most affected by militant activity, the response has involved the mobilisation of security actors at all levels, which has also provided a chance for the government to reorganise and deepen its presence in border communities that were previously neglected. Non-military responses have largely been ad-hoc and suffer from limited coordination across the region, although the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) is attempting to change that. Nonetheless, some key challenges have emerged in regards to this aspect. This report highlights a few areas of concern, beginning with the need to balance security considerations with restrictions on local livelihoods. Given the precarious nature of livelihoods in the Lake Chad region, especially for those displaced, civilians can be threatened by the unintended effects of government or military policies. Restrictions on aspects like movement, transport, or the engagement in certain trades, while taken with security in mind, ultimately increase dependency and forestall the ability of the region to get back on its feet. Vigilante organisations were present throughout the Lake Chad region prior to the Boko Haram crisis, but they have taken on an increased importance in response to it. Yet many questions remain as to their future, especially given the expectations of vigilante members themselves, considering their contribution and the sacrifices endured. The gap in state presence made the reliance on vigilantes necessary, but that same gap in terms of state services will still have to be overcome to ensure the vigilantes remain productive members of society. Over the past few years, a significant number of former combatants have defected from both factions of Boko Haram. However, reintegration is a challenging aspect, which countries in the region have handled differently. The needs of local communities must be taken into account for any re-integration project to succeed, and this aspect will be a key test for the region's ability to move on from a violent chapter in its history. Finally, many parts of the Lake Chad region, especially Nigeria's Borno state, have been devastated by the conflict. Reconstruction efforts are underway but are increasingly intersecting with politics ahead of Nigeria's general and state elections in early 2019. National, state, and local leaders must not allow this to disrupt plans for sustainable solutions in favour of more expedient but ultimately cosmetic adjustments, which may have political benefits but do little with regards to long-term recovery. The response to the Boko Haram crisis is a key test for countries in the region to ensure that they can collectively recover from the destruction of the past few years, but also more pertinently provide for their citizens. As schisms within Boko Haram have led to a development of a faction that prioritises a new relationship with civilians (ISIS-WA), regional governments must do everything they can to ensure their response outpaces that of the militants and succeeds in re-invigorating the social compact between citizen and government in the Lake Chad region, thereby diminishing the long-term appeal of Islamist militancy as an alternative. Details: Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 2018. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 6, 2018 at: https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/2018-07-06-research-report-1.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Africa URL: https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/2018-07-06-research-report-1.pdf Shelf Number: 151026 Keywords: Boko HaramExtremist ViolenceExtremistsIslamic StateRadical GroupsTerrorismVigilantismViolent Extremism |
Author: Ostebo, Terje Title: Islamic Militancy in Africa Summary: - The rise of Islamic militancy in parts of the Sahel and Horn of Africa poses growing threats to regional stability. The appeal of these militants stems from their ability to tap into and persuade marginalized communities, particularly youth, that their grievances can be rectified by the establishment of a more pure Islamist culture. - Despite breakthroughs, Islamic militants in Africa typically do not possess great military power and may not seek to govern at the state level. Rather, they tend to be homegrown phenomena, focused on local concerns. - Islamic militant organizations in Africa generally only command the support of small minorities within Muslim communities. However, ill-considered interventions, especially those involving Western forces, can reinforce the militants' narrative, thereby strengthening their credibility and recruitment. Details: Washington, DC: Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2012. 8p. Source: Internet Resource: Africa Security Brief No. 23: Accessed June 26, 2019 at: https://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/ACSS-Africa-Security-Brief-No.-23-EN.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Africa URL: https://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/ACSS-Africa-Security-Brief-No.-23-EN.pdf Shelf Number: 156699 Keywords: Boko HaramIslamic Militants Islamic Violence |